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In one of nature’s great ironies, we live on a planet two-thirds covered by water, but only about 
three percent of that water can be used for human consumption.  Until the 1990s water was commonly 
considered an issue for natural scientists, hydrologists, and engineers.  Social science inquiry existed only 
at the margins of exploration of a resource that was largely taken for granted.  Today, however, decades 
of river diversion, unsustainable aquifer use, and tapping of non-renewable, often fossil, water sources, 
combined with ever-increasing pollution of both surface and groundwater sources, have led a cacophony 
of voices to point to looming water disaster.  The challenge for the new millennium is how to meet 
diverse  domestic,  industrial,  agricultural,  and  environmental  water  needs  without  overexploiting  the 
resource.  To meet this challenge many countries have begun moving towards Integrated Water Resource 
Management.  In nearly all cases this means that the role of the national government is diminishing in 
favor  of  water  resource  management  at  the  river  basin  or  local  (community)  level.      This  sort  of 
decentralization is a particular form of democratic devolution intended to empower the local population to 
improve accountability, civic engagement, and equity.  After all, who is more likely to make decisions in 
favor of their own water needs than the end users themselves?  It is an innately participatory action that is 
consistent with the deepening of democratic norms and offers tremendous potential to eschew limited and 
failed  statist  systems  in  favor  of  adaptive  governance  that  can  place  management  responsibilities  at 
diverse levels where they will be most efficient.  In practice, however, the challenge is much greater than 
simply  transferring  authority  and  decision-making  to  autonomous  sub-national  units.    The 
decentralization  of  management  to  local  levels,  and  deconcentration  of  management  to  regional 
governance levels controlled by the central government, require integrating management across scales in 
one governance system.  There can be temporal, spatial, and institutional problems that arise (Lovell et al. 
2002).  Within institutional challenges, raised in this paper, there can be inefficiencies within the authority 
transfers, insufficient local political and legal frameworks, an unwillingness of community participants to 
participate in community based resource management structures, and a significant fiscal gap.  
  This paper draws on a study by the author of two agro-pastoral regions struggling to meet their 
water  needs  in  semi-arid  environments:  Tana  River  District  (Kenya)  and  Ambovombe  District 
(Madagascar).  The paper will explore the institutional changes that have taken place with particular 
emphasis  on  the  disengaging  state,  the  lack  of  fiscal  and  administrative  support  throughout  the 
decentralization  processes,  the  community  responses  including  local  elite  capture  of  certain  local 
processes, and the subsequent rise of predatory (informal) private markets at the community level.  
  Through these two cases an interesting conundrum emerges about how to view the water sector.  
At least since the Earth Summit in Rio and the Second Conference on Water in Dublin, both in 1992, it 
has become a standard to disaggregate water by end-use type: agricultural and pastoral water, industrial 
water, maritime water, domestic water, and, more recently, environmental water.  This makes sense as 
water management demands differ by sector, water pricing often differs by sector, and water priorities 
often differ by sector.  Both the Malagasy Water Code of 1998 and the Kenya Water Act of 2002 focus   3 
predominantly on domestic water use even though they rely on agricultural economies and agriculture 
consumers more than 70 percent of the resource.  This is due to efforts focusing on reducing water 
poverty, a major indicator later adopted in the Millennium Development Goals of both countries.   It is 
clear in the subsistence economies of Ambovombe-Androy and Tana River District, however, that agro-
pastoral perceptions are that this is a false distinction.  Where water is for irrigation systems it is possible 
to make a clear distinction between production water and domestic water. However, less than 5 percent of 
agriculture in each of these countries is irrigated, the remainder rely on modest channeling as possible, 
flooding, and rainfall.  The source for the agricultural water is inevitably the same as the domestic water.  
From a local perspective, when farming or herding is the way of life why seek out a supply for your 
family separate from your livelihood?  Even if the water comes from a bucket for domestic consumption, 
when it becomes too dirty to drink you give it to your livestock.  There is a conceptual and mechanistic 
hurdle  to  the  end-use  distinction.    Alleviating  this  would  require  the  development  of  parallel  water 
sources or, at minimum, parallel water pricing from regularized sources.  In neither case does this exist 
(outside of the limited example of the two state-governed irrigation schemes in Tana River District).  
Since this paper focuses on local responses to state water changes it blllurs the end-use distinction in 
favor of the single-source considerations of the local populations.  There are two exceptions in this study: 
Ethnic  Pokomo  communities  in  Tana  River  District  sometimes  have  water  pumps  for  domestic 
consumption  (only)  and  in  this  paper  pumps  are  eschewed  in  favor  of  irrigation  challenges;  in 
Ambovombe-Androy District cattle can survive for some parts of the year on raketa (prickly pear cactus 
fruit).  This is left out of the discussion in favor of the challenge of water sources.   
The project this paper is based on has sought to compare challenges that have emerged between 
decentralizing  state  entities  for  water  resource  management  and  the  perceptions  and  capacities  of 
communities  with  new  found  responsibilities.    Democratic  decentralization  is  intended  to  increase 
efficacy, improve the distribution of the resource, and deepen democracy by providing new avenues of 
popular  participation.    Yet,  legal  and  juridical  frameworks,  agent  empowerment,  history  of  conflict, 
market efficacy, stakeholder diversity, stakeholder goals, and economic inequality drive an imbalance of 
opportunities between stakeholders.  It appears that under some conditions the process of decentralization 
serves  as  a  structural  constraint  to  the  intended  participatory  outcomes.  As  a  result,  would-be 
“participants” in participatory water systems are marginalized, community-based participation in water-
use  decision-making  is  not  possible,  multilevel  governance  is  highly  constrained,  and  the  resource 
management regime risks collapse. 
The field research for this study included focus groups and interviews conducted in Kenya and 
Madagascar in 2002, 2003, and 2004; in the case of Ambovombe-Androy, Madagascar a rural perceptions 
survey was also conducted 2005. While the 1990s were replete with studies on community based natural 
resource management (CBNRM), few CBNRM studies were empirically based and even fewer attempted 
to take a longer term view to assess the challenges and pitfalls of placing increased responsibilities at the 
local  community  level  without  further  thought  to  the  transferability  (or  lack  therein)  of  institutional 
designs, the transfer of capacity, or the nature of community.  By comparing cases that can shed light on 
the  politics  of  institutional  choice  and  the  politics  of  recognition  in  natural  resource  management 
decentralizations, this study hopes to uncover important challenges to positive institutional outcomes in 






Institutional Changes in Kenya and Madagascar 
Kenya has a long history of linking water management to state-driven development goals.  This 
has generally meant the construction of large water facilities (dams, pipelines, etc.) to the benefit of select 
populations in large cities and to the hydroelectric power industry.  In 1986 the government began to 
reassess  its  position,  considering  the  value  of  decentralized  management  and  soft  mechanisms,   4 
particularly pricing.  These culminated into Sessional Paper No.1 of 1999 and the Water Act of 2002 
which served to de-link water from development for the first time while moving towards a basin-level 
approach.   In contrast, while the Malagasy state held on to legal water rights at independence it did not 
link water to development and was not active in the sector.  Water rights became de facto riparian rights 
with  limited  infrastructure  outside  of  modest  urban  facilities  managed  by  the  state  water  company, 
JIRAMA.   The (Water) Sector Strategy and Action Plan SSPA of 1995 and the Water Code of 1998 was 
based on the principles that water must universal, well-managed, and commodified.  While the state 
clarified its rights to govern water, it simultaneously moved most management responsibilities to the local 
level.  Thus despite markedly different institutional histories, Kenya and Madagascar have arrived at 
comparable destinations. 
Kenya’s water provision is based on its Water Plan at independence in 1963.   This provision 
made water a public good and gave all water rights to the Kenyan state.  This is an important doctrinal 
move.  In contrast to English common law or riparian rights which give water rights to those landholders 
who are next to the river, Kenyan water law allowed for prior appropriation. Instead of the right to access 
water vesting in land rights, the right to access water is held by the state and a landowner must request a 
legal right to the resource.  This popular design has been made famous in other places such as Rajasthan 
India, the Negev Israel, and California USA.where the state has used its control over the management of 
water to implement large irrigation schemes.   Kenya never had the finances or the will to venture down 
such a large scale irrigation path and the irrigation schemes it did attempt -- including Bura and Hola in 
Tana River District -- have failed.  However, many of its answers to water woes suffered the same 
weaknesses.  Kenya sought to build its way out of poverty though the regional construction and operation 
of  dams,  tunnels  and  pipelines,  and  the  local  construction  of  systems  of  weirs,  pump  stations  and 
irrigation canals -- what Peter Gleick (2003) has called water’s “hard path.”   
The  reason  for  this  path  is  that  at  independence  in  1963  Kenya’s  primary  goal  was  nation-
building.    It  shortly  thereafter  launched  "Sessional  Paper  No.10  1965  on  African  Socialism  and  its 
Application to Planning in Kenya." This paper directed Government Policy towards priority development 
concerns, specifically poverty, illiteracy and diseases. The policy broadly meant that major basic services 
were going to be expanded and provided free or subsidized by the Government.  In the water sector this 
culminated in the National Master Water Plan of 1974.  Kenya' s Third Development Plan for 1974-1978 
furthered this direction by articulating the need to manage resources for ecological, socio-cultural and 
economic benefits.  The importance of institutional development was introduced for the first time, but the 
hard  path  emphasis  was  accentuated  by  a  “big  push”  towards  obtaining  foreign  funding  for  new 
engineering projects.   It was not until the Kenya Development Plan for 1979-83 that the government 
introduced a costing mechanism.  “Commercialization of Water and Sanitation” facilities in Kenya was 
first featured in Sessional Paper Number 1 of 1986 on “Economic Management for Renewed Growth.” 
This  paper  was  the  first  time  the  government  suggested  the  decentralization  of  the  water  provision 
facilities by the operations to Local authorities, which had the necessary administrative and technical 
capacity. The Local authorities through the Ministry of Local Authority were then urged to revise the 
pricing of the utilities and services (i.e. health and water services) to reflect not only the real cost of 
operation and maintenance, but long term capital stock replacement.  This was something relatively new.  
Farmers  within  irrigation  schemes,  such  as  the  seven  set  up  by  the  National  Irrigation  Board,  were 
accustomed to paying for water but it rarely reflected the real cost.  Riparian and small-scale irrigators 
generally had been free from associated costs.  Thus reevaluating water pricing was a critical move 
towards improved water resource management even if it fell far short of addressing broader concerns of 
institutional design, institutional efficacy, and power distribution.   As a result of the decades of poor state 
decision-making in the context of the hard path, the country’s freshwater availability reduced from 1853 
cm per capita in 1969 to 612 cm per capita in 2004 (Ministry of Water and Irrigation 2005).     
Kenya’s National Water Action Plan of 1992 continued on the hard path, focusing on primarily 
technical issues and ignoring the governance and management issues that had already become apparent.  
Yet,  following  trends  in  international  water  governance  (United  Nations  World  Meteorological 
Association 1992), new water policies were slowly enacted in Kenya in order to decentralize the decision-  5 
making  process  and  integrate  water  resource  management  across  all  levels.    Most  critical  was  the 
Sessional Paper No.1 of 1999, “National Policy on Water Resources Management and Development” 
which mandated the decentralization of the water sector and the subsequent management of the resource 
across scales.  Kenya began shifting towards the so-called “soft-path” of water governance (Gleick 2003).  
This process has placed Kenya’s water resource policies in a state of flux.  The 2002 Water Act, which 
followed, created a river basin management system with nine new institutional types created to integrate 
water resource governance across levels.  These include:  
 
1.  The Water Resources Management Authority (WRMA), which has the responsibility to manage, 
protect and conserve national water resources;  
2.  Six  WRMA  Catchment  Offices,  to  give  the  Authority  a  presence in  different  regions  of  the 
country, facilitating the policy of decentralized water resource management;  
3.  Six Catchment Area Advisory Committees to advise on water conservation, use and allocation;  
4.  A number of Water Resources Users Associations to make possible community participation in 
the management and development of water resources;  
5.  The Water Services Regulatory Board (WRSB);  
6.  Seven Water Services Boards (WSBs) licensed by the WRSB to be responsible for the efficient 
and economical provision of water services;  
7.  Water Service Providers (WSPs) operating under Service Provision Agreements (SPAs);  
8.  The  Water  Services  Trust  Fund  (WSTF)  to  finance  the  extension  of  water  services  to  poor 
communities;  
9.  The Water Appeals Board (WAB), an independent body established to resolve disputes between 
holders of water rights and any other dispute arising within the water sector which cannot be 
resolved at a lower level.  
 
The purpose is to move the nexus of decision-making to the community level.  Water ownership is still 
held by the state (not riparian interests), but communities determine what their water needs are and then 
petition the WRMA, through the catchments offices, to assist with the infrastructure development to meet 
those needs.  WSPs, either public or private, act under SPAs to deliver these services while the WRSB 
ensures that the regulations set by the state to protect the resources are maintained.  These institutions 
only came into effect on July 1, 2005 so it is too soon to measure their success.  Yet the changes are a 
model of the most recent global conventional wisdom on effective water governance (UNDP 2004, World 
Bank 2004, Gleick 2004, International Network of Basin Organizations 2003, Third World Water Forum 
2003)  and  hold  tremendous  potential  for  the  improved  governance,  and  management,  of  Kenya’s 
increasingly scant water resources.  
  In  contrast  to  Kenya,  Madagascar  did  not  set  out  a  national  policy  for  the  water  sector  at 
independence in 1960.   The government’s first foray into national level water resource governance came 
in 1974 in a Decree from the Military Directorate headed by General Gabriel Ramanantsoa.  This decree 
used  only  the  broadest  of  strokes.  It  included  gradually  extending  water  infrastructure  to  the  whole 
country in a measure consistent with economic and social development priorities, to identity the best 
means to make water available to the country, and to standardize water operations across the country.  It 
did, however, also commodify water, stipulating that water tariffs must cover water expenses.  It also 
eschewed Kenya’s statist approach by empowering municipalities to impose taxes for water consumption.  
In  short,  Madagascar’s  water  sector  was  not  linked  to  its  broader  development  objectives.    The 
government did not assert a state right over water or to seek prior apportionment.  It also didn’t specify 
riparian rights.  It was, predominantly, absent.  For its scattered few development projects that required 
engagement  with  the  water  sector,  such  as  hydroelectric  development,  the  state  asserted  a  right  as 
necessary.  The 1974 Decree did not fundamentally alter the mode of water sector development.  To the 
extent that it existed, it was carried out by the government-owned corporation, the Société Malagasy des 
Eaux  et  Electricité  (SMEE).    In  October  1975  the  SMEE  merged  with  the  Société  des  Energies  de   6 
Madagascar (SEM) to form Jiro sy Rano Malagasy (JIRAMA). JIRAMA is to this day the only national 
level water service provider.   
  Whereas Kenya failed at its development goals of providing water to its majority rural poor, 
Madagascar didn’t address it.  Its first efforts to redress the sector came well after international norms had 
begun converging on soft path solutions.  In May 1995, the Government approved the (Water) Sector 
Strategy and Action Plan (SSPA).   The goal was to define the operational objectives in the water and 
sanitation  sector.  Specifically,  it  established  an  objective  of  increasing  the  connection  rate,  then  29 
percent of the country, to 79 percent by the year 2010.  It planned on doing this by strengthening local 
participation in the social and economic development process.  Specifically, it mandated the optimization 
of water management in rural and poor areas alike by placing a greater responsibility on municipal and 
rural local providers.  The strategy relied on seven basic principles:  
 
1)  institutional development through the increased responsibility of actors 
2)  stronger private participation in water withdrawal 
3)  decentralization 
4)  community participation and social mobilization 
5)  training and professionalization 
6)  water resource and environmental protection 
7)  information sharing and health education throughout the country 
 
The state level entity with ultimate responsibility for water delivery is the Ministry of Energy and Mines.  
It must coordinate with the relatively new Ministry of Water and Forest responsible for surface water 
management and the Ministry of Health responsible for assuring potable water.   The Ministry of Energy 
and Mines is organized into four relevant departments: The most critical herein are the Department of 
Water Exploitation and the Alimentation en Eau dans le Sud (AES) which operates exclusively in the 
south of the country.  The AES was created by presidential décret 86-241 in August 1986 with the idea of 
organizing statutes for water management in the south.   It has undertaken two projects, both funded by 
Japan  International  Cooperation  Agency  (JICA).    The  first  project  was  a  water  pipeline  from  the 
Menanadra River near Beloha to the mining rich Tsihombe District.  The second project was a system of 
water truck delivery from the Mandrare River (in Amboasary District) to Ambovombe-Androy District.  
The AES is the only public water supply interest in the region with the exception of scattered urban and 
semi-urban JIRAMA holdings.   
  Reforms  in  Madagascar’s  water  sector  took  place  concurrent  with  its  decentralization  plans.  
Madagascar began its national decentralization process in 1994 (Lois 94-001 à 94-008). Shortly thereafter 
(Loi 95-005) the legal framework for budget transfers began being formulated.  In November 1995 the 
citizenry elected 1347 rural mayors and 45 urban mayors to fill the leadership roles of the newly created 
communes (the second to lowest level of governance).  Then, in April 1998, a constitutional amendment 
championed  by  then  President  Didier  Ratsiraka  created  a  “regional  unitary”  state  with  “autonomous 
provinces” governing the decentralized collectivities.   
  In 1998 Madagascar wrote its first Water Code.  The Code’s primary point is that water should be 
universal, well-managed, and commodified.  It states that water is necessarily in the public domain (and 
thus the state reserves the right to abrogate riparian rights), but must be managed and conserved by 
assessing a value.  The management, distribution, organization, and financing can be public or private, but 
it must include a cost recovery mechanism and must involve local participation.  In urban areas this 
effectively meant that JIRAMA would be privatized.  Despite significant moves towards privatization 
since 1999 it remains a government-owned company.  It services predominantly urban areas and, since 
2003, has experienced significant fiscal crisis that has marred its ability to provide water or electric 
service without frequent and significant interruption.  Some urban areas are seeing their water sectors 
revamped by public-private partnerships. Conflicts over urban water resources, such as that surrounding 
Antarambiby, a primary source for the regional city of Fianarantsoa, are being addressed with varying   7 
levels of success. What of the other 77 percent of the population that lives in rural areas?  This issue is 
less clear.  Policies are limited in scope where they exist at all.   
The decentralization inherent in the Water Code meant that from 1998 to 2004 communes (second 
to  lowest  administrative  level)  assumed  primary  responsibility  for  water  decision-making  including 
management  and  fee  collection.    In  September  2004  President  Marc  Ravalomanana  shifted  the 
decentralization plan to focus on 22 “Regions” (prefect) as the primary level responsible for development 
planning.  However, it did not shift the focus of Madagascar’s water sector which is still intended to 
follow a decentralized, cost recovery-oriented path.  Communes retained the responsibility of maintaining 
horizontal  control  on  spending  decisions  and  accounting  practices.    They  are  responsible  for  the 
management of infrastructure delivery systems including water.  They are also responsible for engaging 
local populations in the planning and monitoring of local development plans. 
    
Lack of Support and the Fiscal Gap 
If  Kenya  and  Madagascar  can  be  said  to  have  arrived  at  the  comparable  institutional 
arrangements, managing water resources across scales, it can also be said that the challenges they face are 
comparable.  Water reforms are costly.  High levels of poverty in rural areas in particular leads to a 
question about how to finance them.  Kenya has a limited history of fiscal transfers, relying instead on 
local income generation.  Madagascar has a highly centralized economy and has long recognized the need 
for fiscal transfers but little history of doing so in large percentages.   In both cases there is limited 
capacity developed at the local level to manage water resources or even participate in resource decision-
making, even if, in Kenya at least, the responsibilities of local participants and the institutional chain of 
communication is legally clear.  In both cases the plan is for the private sector to play a significant role in 
financing water sector renewal but the mechanisms have not been clearly articulated and the environment 
has  not  been  made  attractive  to  investment.  Thus  both  countries  are  assuming  tremendous  risks  by 
disengaging primary state functions without a clear indication of how the resource will be managed in 
practice or who will pay for it. 
   
Kenya 
Kenya has not had a national decentralization strategy until recently.  Fiscal transfers, outside of 
school  teacher  funding  and  occasional  strategic  assistance  for  severe  poverty,  have  been  extremely 
limited.  Local governments have relied almost entirely on property taxes, payroll taxes, and business 
taxes.  With an increasing national tax base (owing to a political environment more friendly to foreign 
business),  this  is  changing.    The  Ministry  of  Local  Government  has  begun  working  on  institutional 
capacity reforms intended to more effectively manage their revenues through citizen participation.  One 
of the key mechanisms established, in 2000, is the Local Authority Transfer Fund (LATF).  The goal of 
the LATF is to rationalize the financial relationship between central and local governments by providing 
local authorities an incentive to improve service delivery and financial management.  The LATF transfers 
5 percent of revenues to local authorities (Oyugi 2005, DFID 2002). For many rural local authorities this 
is a significant fiscal infusion despite the relatively low transfer rate.  There has not, however, been a 
sufficient benefit to the decentralized water institutions.  The LATF transfers go to the local authorities.  
Local authorities collect service fees for water provisions but they are not responsible for funding water 
source development, maintenance, or delivery.  Funding for water projects under the new system go 
through the WRMA or the WSTF.  They have a parallel, deconcentrated governance structure from the 
state to sub-basin level.  In order for benefits to be felt in the water sector from fiscal transfers funds must 
be transferred from the WRMA or WSTF central offices down to the basins, through the District Water 
Office into the hands of community groups.  
  As part of the National Water Services Strategy the Ministry of Water and Irrigation recognizes 
that there is an economic challenge at hand.  The ten-year goal is to increase urban supply coverage from 
68 percent to 84 percent and rural water supply coverage from 49 percent to 74 percent.  In the rural 
sector this includes the modest goal of connecting 15 percent of rural homes to water supply while raising 
rural sewerage from 2.4 percent to 8.7 percent of the population.  It estimates that it will need to invest   8 
235 bill KSH ($3.3 bill) between 2005 and 2015.  In rural areas the lion’s share of the need, 96 bill KSH 
($1.4  bill),  is  the  development  of  infrastructure  for  water  supply.  In  order  to  meet  this  goal,  the 
government has set out an investment program that includes the commercialization of water services 
provisions (to improve user fee collection), promote private sector participation in urban areas, promote 
syndicates in small town and large scale rural areas, promote private sector participation in small rural 
piped  schemes  operated  by  communities,  establish  micro-credit  programs  for  community  provider 
development, and increase billing efficiency while raising tariffs (Ministry of Water and Irrigation 2004).   
There is great potential for this strategy.  However, in Kenya’s plan there are a couple sticking points that 
must be resolved if this effort is to succeed.   
First, neither the environment nor the incentives appear to be in place on pace with the move 
towards reform.  As pointed out by Price Waterhouse Cooper (2005), for private sector provider (PSP) 
schemes to work the infrastructure must be viable, there must be uniform political will, there must be a 
legal, institutional and regulatory framework conducive to PSPs, there must be government 
implementation capacity, and Kenya’s image needs to be revamped to appear attractive.  
Second, Kenya’s move towards water commodification needs to be married to rural realities.  
Water is a social good and as such should be free.  Yet, as famously noted by former IMF Managing 
Director Michael Camdessus, while the water can be free someone needs to pay for the pipes.  Panels at 
the Third World Water Forum (in 2003) made clear that while the privatization of public water companies 
in poor countries has a spotty record at best, there are success stories of public-private partnerships where 
the private sector collects, treats, and delivers water to customers with improved efficiency in urban 
(Senegal, Mali) areas.  Yet, even proponents of an increased role for private enterprise in the water sector 
have come to argue that in poor countries there must first be significant public investment (Winpenny 
2003) and even with that there are other structural factors that lead to a spotty record (Moore and 
Urquhart 2004).  Kenya has a dodgy history with private sector water reform.   There have been 
successful management contracts in Malindi, Nyali, and Karen, but challenges have wrought attempts in 
Nairobi, Narok, Trans Mara, Samburu, Nyeri, Eldoret and elsewhere; in one case, Nakuru, there was even 
a costly reversal of a public-private partnership contract (Onjala 2002).  Water has been an unconvincing 
investment in Kenya’s urban sector, so it is certainly, as of yet, unconvincing in the rural sector. 
Third, not present in Kenya’s formulation are significant fiscal transfers.  Local funds and investment 
will be a requisite part of the funding schema.  Yet rural areas account for 51 percent of the assessed need.  
There is an urban-rural divide of over 30 percent in Kenya (Sahn and Stifel 2002).  While lower than 
Madagascar’s 45 percent it is still significant.  Incomes in Nairobi average 72,446 KSH ($1,018), nearly 
four times that of a rural area such as Tana River District with income averaging 18,684 KSH ($262).  
The UNDP’s Human Poverty Index  follows a similar pattern with a score of 25.9 for Nairobi and 49.2 
for Tana River District  (UNDP 2005a).  If we consider that Tana River District has a population of 
approximately 215,000 (Republic of Kenya 2001) then we can estimate total revenue for the district to be 
approximately $56 mill.  This is sufficient to assume end-users will pay for water delivery per unit but it 
is not a sufficient base from which to extract enough funds for significant infrastructure investment.  A 
problem considering “the existing water facilities in the district are not enough to adequately provide for 
domestic, livestock and industrial use and therefore need to be augmented” (Tana River District 
Development Plan (2001: 43).   
Finally, the urban-rural divide aggravates the development of rural water supply when the sectoral 
equalization measure is removed.  There are two such mechanisms: the state can transfer resources to the 
rural areas to fund local initiatives for water resource development or it can invest the capital raised in 
urban areas into rural areas through state projects.  The new water strategy does neither of these things.  
Thus whereas Kenya finally appears to be getting its sectoral management plan in order, it appears to 
have  undermined  the  necessary  “hard”  investments.    This  is  a  challenge.    The  Kenyan  Millennium 
Development Goals Assessment (UNDP 2005b) argues that the problem identified in Tana River District 
is  universal  in  Kenya.    There  is  significant  investment  necessary  just  to  renew  decaying  water 
infrastructure.  Moreover, the most important feature in Kenya’s meeting its water goals is an increase in 
per capita water storage.  This is not a “soft” problem.  Such large scale infrastructure investments are   9 
exactly the sort of investments that are the most difficult to achieve at the local level.  In the rural sector it 
is  a  near  impossibility  as  even  collective  revenues  generally  fall  significantly  short  of  capital 
improvement  costs.    In  short,  while  local  management  of  resources  is  possible,  local  infrastructure 
development absent significant fiscal transfers is a problem.  Given its challenged funding regime, it 
appears  that  Kenya  runs  the  risk  of  transferring  fiscal  shortcomings  to  rural  areas  where  economic 
capacity  is  significantly  lower  than  in  urban  areas.  While  this  is  a  broadly  applicable  concern,  this 
problem is very acute in the Tana River District where water resource scarcity has a long and recent 
history of leading to armed conflict between agricultural and pastoral communities.   
 
Madagascar   
In Madagascar the challenge is somewhat greater.  According to the Millennium Development Goals 
Assessment (PNUD 2004) only 11.7 percent of Madagascar’s rural sector had regular access to potable 
water in 2001.  The goal is to bring it to 53.8 percent by 2015.  A grating 71 percent of the population of 
the country lives in poverty, 62 percent in extreme poverty.  Some 77 percent of the country relies on 
agriculture for a living making water a tremendous concern (UNDP 2002).  Without a central planning 
facility, even a flawed one, infrastructure development is significantly lagging behind Kenya’s.   
The  difference  in  governance  between  the  countries  is  that  in  Madagascar  there  has  been  a 
national decentralization program in place for over a decade and it is not designed in parallel to a water 
decentralization  scheme.  The  responsibility  of  development  is  being  devolved  from  the  central 
government to the region level with many functions, including water provisions, decentralized to the 
commune level.  Thus if a community requires an investment in the water sector, institutional support, 
training, etc. then it must ask the region for assistance.  Unfortunately, while Madagascar’s governance 
may  be  concurrently  deconcentrating  to  the  region  level  and  decentralizing  to  the  commune  level, 
Madagascar’s fiscal structure remains one of the most centralized in the world.  In contrast to Kenya, 
there is little history of local tax assessment.  One of the issues is that there is a significantly higher 
percentage  of  the  population  that  is  rural  and  throughout  much  of  rural  Madagascar  there  has  not 
historically been land titling. There are new initiatives in place to introduce land titling, but to date the 
rural sector lacks the income generation from land value assessments.  Local governments thus don’t have 
taxable land.  There is also a limited formal business sector in rural Madagascar to tax. Further, state and 
regional capacity to collect taxes has long been wanting.  As a result, only about 1 percent of revenue 
collected  in  Madagascar is  local  and  local  government  is  almost  completely  dependent  upon  capital 
transfers.  VAT, Corporate Income taxes, and foreign trade taxes alone account for approximately 78 
percent of total tax revenues.  Deconcentrated expenditures (which generally go to the region for health 
and education) amount to approximately 10 percent of total revenues.  For the Ministry of Energy and 
Mines, responsible for the water sector, only 3.56 percent is devolved.   Decentralized expenditure (which 
generally goes to the commune) is only about 3 to 4 percent thus, with 1 percent local revenue collection, 
intra-governmental capital transfers amount to about 2 to 3 percent of Malagasy revenues (World Bank 
2003). This amounts to an average of $1.54 per capita in urban communes and $0.86 in rural communes.  
In each of Ambovombe-Androy’s 17 communes, under study herein, the total comes to US$9800 or about 
$0.55 per capita.  These figures are for all commune costs.  Transfer expenditures available to the water 
sector  at  the  commune  level  are  thus  a  fraction  of  these  figures  when  available  at  all.    Insufficient 
revenues are being transferred to the local level and a fiscal gap has emerged.  As communes, especially 
rural  communes,  have  taken  on  the  responsibility  of  not  only  water  facility  management  but  water 
infrastructure development they have found that they lack the resources and progress is nil.   
 
Community Responses to Governance Across Scales and Elite Capture in Kenya: The Case of Tana 
River District 
Beyond the fiscal gap Kenya is faced with the challenge of creating a bureaucratically effective 
water management system in rural areas where poverty is high and development low.  There have been 
two major problems.  First, the relationship between the levels of governance have not made for effective 
management and, second, where advances have been made inter and even intra-community tensions have   10 
arisen as the result of elite capture.  In Kenya the “bottom up” of a community-based, decentralized 
system has actually been created from the “top down” with little local, especially rural, input.  This poses 
a challenge of power.  Elinor Ostrom (1999) discusses this problem in her widely received distinction 
between multi-level and polycentric governance.  In the former responsibilities for resource management 
are  distributed  between  different  levels  of  government.    However,  there  is  no  focus  on  the  power 
distribution between those levels. In the latter the emphasis is placed on multiple centers for decision-
making about the resource. “Polycentric systems are themselves complex adaptive systems without one 
dominating  central  authority”  (Ostrom  1999:  528).  The  version  of  Integrated  Water  Resource 
Management adopted in Kenya is not polycentric.  The nexus of decision-making remains in Nairobi.  It 
therefore becomes necessary to communicate rules and norms down the levels of governance from the 
Directorate to the community and to communicate community needs up the levels of governance from the 
community to the Directorate. This sets up a neo-clientalist relationship.   
The job of assisting communities in assessing their water needs, and communicating those needs 
to the WRMA or the WSTF regional offices, must fall to the district water office.  For such a system to 
work, the District Water Officers in rural areas must stay informed of changes in rules and norms via 
regular trips to Nairobi.  The district staff must then circulate this information in rural areas.  The District 
Water Officer and staff must then assist the community in their formal bids for funding.  Unfortunately, in 
a district like Tana River, regional water offices and communities are both ill equipped to manage the job 
at hand.  First, there are only water offices in the towns of Hola, Galole, and Garsen for the whole of a 
very large geographic area (Appendix A). Second, there is not a budget for the staff to circulate or to 
maintain the  (one)  Land Rover.    Third,  road  infrastructure  is  extremely  poor  throughout the  district 
making access a challenge.  Fourth, the only public transit is along the national highway, many kilometers 
from a lot of communities.  Fifth, and most egregious, the process of applying for funds appears not to 
have been written with communities in mind.  Tana River District has a significant education challenge.  
The population is divided ethnically between Pokomo farmers who have access to the Tana River and 
Orma pastoralists who do not have access to the river.  Most schools are in Pokomo towns.  There are few 
schools  compared  to  the  population  (103  primary  schools,  10  secondary  schools,  and  2  youth 
polytechnics; Republic of Kenya 2001) and these are underutilized.  Those that do make it to secondary 
school regularly perform very poorly on national exams.  As a result, literacy rates are low.  Spoken 
KiSwahili is prevalent  in the sub-districts  near  the coast,  notably  Garsen,  and  a  large  percentage  of 
Pokomo speak KiSwahili to varying degrees of proficiency as a second language.  Many fewer Orma 
speak KiSwahili.  Few of either group are proficient in English. The process for assistance with water 
infrastructure investment, training, management and any other financially bound resource requires the 
completion of an application to the Water Services Trust Fund.  The application is in English only.  As 
designed, the questions are also well above the capacity of most communities and would require the 
community to invest in a consultant (Appendix B).  Finally, with the bulk of funds coming from local, 
rather than national, sources, the money trickling down is scant.  Communities appear to feel the weight 
of responsibility without the power of the purse.   
  Where there have been successful investments in local, rural water infrastructure they have often 
suffered  from  elite  capture.  For  example:  In  reaction  to  increased  conflict  in  the  1990s  voluntary 
organizations, notably the Catholic Diocese, began working with the Arid Lands Office (directly out of 
the Office of the President) and the Ministry of Water and Irrigation to build 25 inexpensive earth dams 
(on average 20,000 cm of storage) and, less commonly, boreholes for Orma communities in the Tana 
River District. This is consistent with both the tenet of the strategy that calls for increased water storage 
and the tenet looking to increase water harvesting.  It is also a stellar opportunity to introduce a response 
to water demand that can be effectively community managed.  It could require community participation in 
the construction of the dam followed by the creation of community level management structures including 
fee  structures  for  dam  maintenance.    The  technical  expertise  requisite  for  the  earth  dam  comes  in 
capturing the season flows from surface lagers (small streams of run off from arid soils with low retention 
rates) and creating an effective filtering system by natural design (Appendix C). It is a relatively simple 
project with high success rates in construction.  Earth dams in the south of the district, where there are   11 
more rains, tend to maintain water year round.  In the north, however, they are often dry for much of the 
year.   
Communities and Ministry officials alike argue that earth dams and boreholes are a more efficient 
solution for Orma water needs than large infrastructure as the population is very dispersed and semi-
nomadic.  In general, communities were fast and successful at setting up water users’ groups with a 
managerial committee.  As argued in one focus group: 
 
“We really appreciate the idea to construct the dam here because it has saved us time and effort we used to 
spend to get water from distant sources. We have tried to maintain it and nowadays we don’t have many 
cases of water-related diseases. We have rules that govern how we use the water. We have tried to ensure 
that the place is clean and healthy but it is not an easy exercise. We have fenced the dam and employed a 
watchman to keep livestock at bay. [Second Respondent] Livestock do not have direct access to the water 
source; instead, the owner gets water and quenches the animals away from the source. There is a pump and 
whoever wants to use the water gets it from the tap point [sic; Third Respondent] We have a chairman, 
secretary, treasurer and members. There are also caretakers, who open and close the water point. Currently 
it’s done by the women.” 
 
Notable in this quote is the focus on livestock.  At inception the earth dams were intended by the Kenyan 
Arid  Lands  office,  the  Ministry,  and  the  Diocese  for  domestic  consumption  only  --  livestock  were 
disallowed.  However, it quickly became clear that such a separation could not successfully be imposed 
on the communities.  The Diocese took the lead in assisting communities to formulate strategies for 
maintaining the health of the water source.  This is the reason for the clear articulation in virtually every 
focus group that livestock access costs and livestock access must be at access points away from the edge 
of the dam.  With these rule reforms in place, the dams became popular within communities. 
In contrast to many such community efforts, community elites fight to be on such committees as 
with it comes opportunity.  Pricing is generally modest for the community, generally between 10KSH 
($0.14) and 40 KSH ($0.57) per month with surcharges for those with a large number of livestock.  
However, foreign Orma pay excessive use rates -- as high as 1000 KSH ($14) per day (payment can 
generally be made in livestock or cash).  As Orma are a semi-nomadic population foreigners can often be 
from northern Kenya or even Somalia.  However, the earth dams are intended to serve approximately 
3,000  families  while  most  water  committees indicate  only  between  100  and 200  families registered.  
Foreigners can also be Tana River District residents traveling south in search of water or grazing for 
livestock.  Thus “foreigners” can often be Orma and local.  The water also elicits funds through penalties: 
 
“Say if somebody opens water without permission he or she is fined. And the fine varies. Non-
community members are charged 1000/=; and residents are charged 500/=. Those found washing 
in the prohibited areas are charged up to 1500/=.” (Chairman of a Local Water Committee) 
 
The dams are both a source of great revenue and conflict. Now that some of the earth dams are 
starting to age and require dredging it is clear that many of the committees banked only a small amount of 
those funds.  The remainder goes to the committee members.  As a result, it rapidly became the case in a 
number of examples that the earth dams became a social mechanism.  The committees are comprised of 
community members who have moved into an elite status by virtue of their family heritage, personal 
wealth, or charismatic leadership abilities.  The committees collect the fees for water use. The funds that 
are  not  banked  are  sometimes  held  by  individuals  but  more  commonly  put  into  livestock  that  are 
integrated into the herds of those elites.  In some cases those livestock are counted separately as one 
might consider water bank funds.  In other cases the livestock become the personal property of the herd 
owners.  In both cases the enlarged herd serves to buoy the herd owners social position. Thus water fees 
have empowered elites who could, via their position as a member of the water committee, capture the 
power  of  the  region’s  most  important  resource  for  their  personal  gain.    This  is  potentially  further 
imperiling as it can set up a contest between community members for the lucrative water committee 
positions.  Where the funds for maintenance don’t exist it becomes necessary for communities to once   12 
again ask for assistance.  The voluntary associations and the state bureaus responsible for the construction 
of the earth dams are then faced with the decision of having to provide more funds -- effectively admitting 
that the scheme failed for reasons of community management not design or resource -- or let the dam 
collapse.  The lesson here is about the potential volatility of the soft path.  While prioritizing management 
is  of  course  critical,  it  is  equally  important  to  ensure  the  viability  of  the  institutional  capacity,  the 
membership, and the accountability mechanisms. 
 
The  Local  Challenge:  Perceptions  and  the  Rise  of  Predatory  Private  Markets  in  Ambovombe-
Androy, Madagascar 
  Amobovombe-Androy  is  a  poor  district  of  17  communes  in  Madagascar’s  extreme  south 
(Appendix D).  As it is predominantly encompassed in a hydrologically closed basin and receives only 
about 300 mm or rain per year obtaining water is, by far, the most important concern of the citizenry.
1    
The average person consumes an average of just over 5 liters of water per day, about 10 percent of the 
commonly marked water poverty line and about 1 percent of consumption in western countries.  In the 
rainy season (about 4 months) most of Ambovombe’s water needs are met by community level water 
storage facilities.  For the rest of the year the population must rely upon three sources: boreholes and 
water catchments, the AES project (which trucks water from the Mandrare River), and informal water 
markets.  All of these are insufficient, forcing regularized discussion by communities and leaders about 
how to improve the water supply of the approximately 300,000 residents. 
  As discussed, at the core of many of Madagascar’s institutional changes is the deconcentration of 
development planning to the regions and the decentralization of management in many sectors, including 
water, to the commune level.  The intention of such efforts is to put formal horizontal control on spending 
decisions and accounting practices.  Expenditure should occur at the lowest level of government that can 
effectively capture costs and benefits to public service.  The state should internalize externalities across 
jurisdictions and carry out expenditures that involve stabilization, distribution, or standards.  The lack of 
fiscal transfer is an indication that the state is not living up to its end of the bargain.  However, if the 
commune  is  to  effectively  capture  costs  and  benefits  then  it  must  also  be  held  accountable  by  the 
population.    The  Chief  of  Region  is  appointed  by  the  Ministry  of  Decentralization  so  there  is  no 
accountability to the population.  The mayor of the commune is elected, but, it appears, the population 
does not always take ownership of his position, authority, or level of government.   
  Community  members  were  asked  a  series  of  questions  about  the  nature  of  their  community 
identity.  The rationale is that institutional boundaries in an integrated management system should be 
social  with  communities  delineating  rights  and  jurisdictions  (Barrow  and  Murphree  2001,  Murphree 
2000, Williams 1998).  In all cases the response was that the “community” was the fokontany level not the 
commune level.  The commune level, averaging three fokontany each, is perceived as too abstracted.  
Moreover, only a small percentage see local elections as the best way to hold a leader accountable.  
Eighty-four percent of the population prefers selecting a leader through community discussions; removal 
of the leader follows.  The pattern of fokontany preference for governance transects sectors to include 
land  and  grazing  decisions,  water  decisions,  identification  of  community  leadership,  and  conflict 
resolution. 
 
[Insert Figures 1-3 here] 
 
  Overwhelmingly  (85  percent)  people  do  want  to  see  a  greater  role  for  their  communities.  
However, who should be in decision-making groups (such as water resource decision-making) are either 
members of a fokontany (59 percent) or a hamlet (35 percent).  Only 5 percent of the population wants to 
see membership in decision-making groups decided at the commune level and zero want it any higher.  To 
date communes have not received the fiscal transfers necessary for water infrastructure development.  
                                                 
1 Unless otherwise indicated all statistics come from a survey conducted by the author in May-June 2005.  The 
survey was a random sample of the district with 521 respondents stratified by commune and fokontany.   13 
There have, however, been a limited number of public boreholes and water catchments development by 
international donors and non-government organizations. “Community” based water resource management 
committees have been constructed at the commune level to manage these facilities.  The challenge is that 
even these minimal efforts are often not owned, trusted, or held accountable by the population.  While 
most people know who their mayor is, few keep track of his activities and fewer see him often.  Where 
the water committees are part of the commune leadership they are often seen as corrupt.  Where they are 
constructed  parallel to  the  commune leadership  they  are  seen  as  a  competitive  source of  power that 
undermines commune authority.  In the case of Ambovombe-Androy communes hardly appear prepared 
for increased fiscal transfers for water or any other function if and when they should come. 
The second source of water is the AES.  This is a deconcentrated system within the Ministry of 
Energy and Mines.  The process set up is that each fokontany (the smallest administrative unit in the 
Malagasy system) is to ask its commune for water.  The Ambovombe communes tender a request for 
water to the AES.  The cost for a 6 cm truck of water in 2005 was about US$13.  The system was 
corrupted from the start of the project in 1993 as drivers would hold the water hostage demanding a gift 
for the delivery, generally about the same cost as the water itself.  As of 2005, 4 trucks were still in 
operation with the capacity to deliver 72,000 liters per day or about ¼ liter per person.  The scarcity has 
forced a premium on the “gifts” (which can exceed US$40) to the drivers and water delivery has become 
the prerogative of the rich.   
The lack of successful resource regimes leads to a third option for obtaining water: opportunistic, 
often predatory, private borehole owners.  The word “Ambovombe” means “the place of big wells” and 
the meaning still holds.  Under most of the district’s sandy soils lies saline water if there is any at all.  
Ambovombe town grew as a result of its fresh groundwater and, while now woefully insufficient, it 
remains one of the few places where wells do not dry up in the starving season.  In April or May, at the 
end of the rainy season, private water may cost US$0.03 per 15 liter bucket (US$2/cm).  By September 
those same providers may charge upwards of US$0.28 per bucket (US$18.66/cm).  If we consider that the 
average income in Ambovombe is less than US$0.27 per household her day, rural water delivery in 
Kenya averages approximately US$0.35/cm, and the city of Los Angeles USA, with a median household 
income of $100.51 per day (US Census), pays an average of  US$0.77/cm (2005) then it is clear that 
comparably semi-arid environments have markedly different interpretations of water pricing.  Residents 
of Ambovombe-Androy are willing to pay for water.  At an average of 100 ariary per bucket ($2.67/cm) 
they are willing to pay many times more of their income for water than urban consumers in Los Angeles 
are willing to pay ($4.13/cm
2).  The challenge is that the water price regime is no more stable than the 
water regime istelf.   
The difference between a wealthy city like Los Angeles and a poor rural area like Ambovombe-
Androy is not willingness to pay for water services.  The difference is that the infrastructure investment 
has not been significant enough to stabilize water supply and cost.  There is a substantial literature that 
describes how increased infrastructure decreases water prices by regularizing supply and eliminating the 
room for predatory private markets to operate (Bhatia and Falkenmark 1993).  JICA is financing the study 
on a new drinking water supply system.  The intent is to build a gravity fed pipe to transfer water from 
Manavy to Ambovombe and from Ambovombe to Antaritarika. The ongoing study will be finalized in 
August 2006. (African Development Bank 2005).  There are some significant challenges.  First, this 
would only address drinking water needs and not agro-pastoral needs.  If, as mentioned above, there is not 
a clear distinction at the local level the pipe can be seen as unsatisfactory to a local concerned with their 
livelihoods.  It  could  possibly  even  lead  to  local  governance  challenges  as  managers  would  have 
significant incentive to sell water for production use, particularly the watering of livestock.  Second, while 
the pipeline would provide regularized drinking water supply year round within the willingness to pay of 
consumers, it would likely only be available within the central Ambovombe communes.  Fourth, even 
presuming  the  state,  in  this  case  the  Ministry  of  Energy  and  Mines,  is  infused  by  the  African 
                                                 
2 Derived from consumption and pricing figures of the Los Angeles Department of Water and Power 
(http://www.ladwp.com) and Alcubilla 2005.    14 
Development Bank and the World Bank with the capital to construct the pipeline, and they achieve their 
goal, it does not abrogate commune responsibilities.  These will include standpipe management by user 
associations, operation and maintenance of facilities, wastewater and drainage, and, most importantly, fee 
collection  and  financial  management.  Given  the  aforementioned  challenges  to  “community”  identity 
capacity development and popular accountability could prove a challenge.  Further, as the standpipes will 
likely be situated only in the central communes (or perhaps even just Ambovombe commune) residents of 
other communes will have to travel to town to purchase the water.  Beyond perceived community, they 
will be out of their voting jurisdiction and thus won’t hold an accountability measure. The opportunity for 
elite predation of the sort found in Tana River District will increase. 
 
Conclusion 
The history of water resource governance in Kenya and Madagascar is grim.  Where Kenya’s 
bloated state organizations overbuilt infrastructure to the cost of the many and the benefit of the few, 
Madagascar’s public water sector has remained shockingly limited in scale and scope.  The results are 
similar.  Only 49 percent of Kenya’s rural citizens, and 11.7 percent of Madagascar’s rural citizens, have 
regular  access  to  clean  water  --  a  travesty  in  countries  where  two-thirds  and  three-fourths  of  the 
population respectively live in rural areas.  The decision by both governments in the 1990s to reform their 
water sectors has opened up new promise.  For the first time in history there is a global convergence on 
the priorities for water sector governance and both of these governments have embarked on this path that 
has proved rewarding from Singapore to Zambia.  Kenya and Madagascar have started down this path of 
Integrated Water Resource Management.  Dovetailing with democratic decentralization programs, the 
citizenry  have  new  opportunities  to  express their  needs  and  manage  their  resources in a  sector that, 
despite its critical role to the survival of life, has had been neglected for generations.  They undertake 
these projects with hope brought by new governments brought about by parallel steps towards deeper 
democracy in 2002 and the increased interest and funding of international donors. 
With  all  the  potential  there  are  challenges  to  integrating  water  management  across  scales  in 
Kenya and Madagascar.  The largest problem in both countries is “where does the money come from?”  
In neither case has the fiscal gap and lack of local resources been sufficiently addressed.  In both cases 
there are also significant institutional concerns.  There is reason for concern over the preparedness of the 
local, rural institutions to take on the new responsibilities given to them.  At the state level there is reason 
for  concern  that  states  are  treating  “integration”  or  “multi-level”  governance  as  an  opportunity  to 
disengage from providing necessary leadership.  This poses a problem for infrastructure support.  This 
poses a problem for the development of legal, juridical, and regulatory frameworks.  This poses a problem 
for ensuring the placement of mechanisms to ensure that communication across scales is fluid.  This begs 
the question “who is the Leviathan” as water needs transect resource zones and end users compete over a 
commons of multiple jurisdictions.     
The cases of Tana River District, Kenya and Ambovombe-Androy, Madagascar do not point back 
to the rise of vociferous states seeking to build water infrastructure managed for the few at the expense of 
the many.  They do, however, point to a need to approach decentralized water governance with as much 
caution as optimism.  Both countries have placed a strong reliance for funding on the private sector 
without  creating  a  proper  environment  and  without  considering  the  important  differences  between 
privatization  and  public-private  partnerships,  let  alone  the  nature  of  diverse  potential  public-private 
relationships.  Private interests hold the potential for generating funds and building efficiency but they 
have a spotty history of water management in many countries, including Kenya, and thus they should be 
seen as a potential boon to a functioning water system with an effective fiscal transfer and a proven 
regulatory framework.  The process of management is the same whether it is public or private.  The 
question isn’t whether the private sector can substitute for an ailing state; the question is who is best 
placed to assume the risks of a viable system.  Most importantly, there is an institutional crisis looming.  
There are myriad relationships between institutions at every level of governance and even more across 
levels  of  governance.    The  communities  that  are  intended  to  take  part  in  the  management  of  water 
resources,  hitherto  marginalized  from  the  nexus  of  decision-making  process,  create  their  own   15 
relationships with institutions across scales and are, ultimately, germane to their success.  If Kenya and 
Madagascar are to successfully integrate water governance in rural areas then there needs to be a more 
nuanced  state-local  relationship  characterized  by  an  open  dialog  and  the  regular  fulfilling  of  the 
responsibilities by each level of actor.     16 
Appendix A: Tana River District 
 
 
Source: Ministry of Water and Irrigation   17 
Appendix B: Water Services Trust Fund Application for Funds 
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Appendix D: Southern Madagascar   20 
































Figure 3: Community Perceptions of Conflict Resolution 
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